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Hippodamus of  Miletus and the 
Character of  the Athenian Dikastic Oath 
(Arist. Pol. 2.8) 
Anders Dahl Sørensen 
1. The debate over the Athenian dikastic oath 
Each year, those 6000 citizens of classical Athens who had 
been selected by lot to serve as citizen-judges (‘dikasts’) in the 
popular law courts swore an oath on the hill of Ardettos outside 
the city-walls, solemnly stating their commitment to a set of fun-
damental principles that should guide their judicial decisions.1 
The importance of this ‘dikastic oath’ for understanding the 
character of the Athenian legal system is not difficult to see. 
Given the crucial role of oaths in regulating human conduct in 
ancient societies, what the dikastic oath required the dikasts to 
do is likely to have shaped, not only the self-understanding, but 
also the judicial practice of the Athenian law courts. It is there-
fore all the more unfortunate that the oath is not found in its 
entirety in any surviving ancient source.2 Max Fränkel’s classic 
reconstruction is elegant and has been widely accepted by 
scholars, but it is at bottom an intricate pastiche made up of bits 
and pieces drawn from a large number of citations of, and 
allusions to, the oath in Athenian law court speeches and in later 
 
1 M. H. Hansen, Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford/ Cam-
bridge [Mass.] 1991) 181–183. 
2 Scholars agree that the version cited in Dem. 24.149–151 is not authentic 
but probably an interpolated reconstruction by a later editor. See S. 
Johnstone, Disputes and Democracy. The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens 
(Austin 1999) 34; E. Harris, The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens 
(Oxford 2013) 101 n1. 
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grammarians.3 Accordingly, many of its individual elements 
leave room for doubt.4 Two specific clauses do, however, seem 
to have certainly been in the oath. The dikasts swore, perhaps in 
the opening lines of the oath, to cast their vote “in accordance 
with the laws” (κατὰ τοὺς νόµους).5 And they swore to cast their 
vote in accordance with justice or, as the phrase probably went, 
“in accordance with their most just consideration” (γνώµῃ τῇ 
δικαιοτάτῃ).6  
The question of the scope of application of the second clause 
(the ‘justice clause’) has been the subject of particular contro-
versy. This is not surprising, for that question plays into a much 
larger debate concerning the very nature of the rule of law in 
classical Athens. Some scholars conceive of the justice clause as 
a general principle that was understood to apply to all judicial 
decisions made by the dikasts. On the most common version of 
this view, the justice clause functioned as something like a prin-
ciple of ‘equity’, under which the requirement of rigid adherence 
to the laws could be downplayed, or even set aside, in favour of 
other, extra-legal considerations, when the particular circum-
stances seemed to the dikasts to require it.7 Other scholars have 
 
3 M. Fränkel, “Der attische Heliasteneid,” Hermes 13 (1878) 452–466. 
4 For a step-by-step discussion of Fränkel’s reconstruction see D. C. 
Mirhady, “The Dikast’s Oath and the Question of Fact,” in A. Sommerstein 
and J. Fletcher (eds.), Horkos. The Oath in Greek Society (Liverpool 2008) 49–51. 
5 Aeschin. 3.6, 31, 198; Dem. 18.121; 20.118; 21.42, 211; 22.43; 23.101; 
24.188; 32.45; 34.45; 36.26; 46.27; 58.25, 36; 59.115; Din. 1.17; Hyp. 2.5; 
Isae. 11.6; Isoc. 15.173, 19.15; Lys. 22.7. Cf. Fränkel, Hermes 13 (1878) 453; 
Johnstone, Disputes and Democracy 35; Mirhady, in Horkos 49–50. In some 
speeches, the speaker expands the phrase to include “the decrees of the 
people” (Din. 1.84, Hyp. 5.1) or even “the decrees of the people and of the 
council of five hundred” (Dem. 19.179). 
6 Vote in accordance with justice: Dem. 21.4, 94; 58.61; Andoc. 1.31; Isoc. 
19.15–16. Vote in accordance with most just consideration: Dem. 20.118, 
23.96, 39.40–41, 57.26. Cf. Johnstone, Disputes and Democracy 40; Mirhady, in 
Horkos 50. 
7 P. Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence II (Oxford 1922) 68; L. 
Gernet, Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne (Paris 1965) 57; S. C. Todd, The 
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argued for a more legalist interpretation of the status of the 
justice clause in the dikastic oath. What distinguishes this inter-
pretation from the first is that it takes the application of the 
clause to be much more restricted: considerations of justice were 
meant to guide the reasoning of the dikasts only in those specific 
cases where there happened to be no laws covering the par-
ticular situation.8 In all other cases, the oath demanded, con-
siderations of legality should be all that mattered. In the words 
of one of the most prominent contemporary proponents of this 
interpretation, the oath’s requirement that the dikasts judge in 
accordance with their most just consideration was meant to be 
nothing more than “a default clause to be used only in excep-
tional cases.”9  
The aim of the present paper is not to revisit yet again the 
many disputed passages that have been marshalled by both 
sides, nor to attempt to resolve the issue decisively in favour of 
one interpretation or the other. My contribution to the debate 
will be more modest, if nonetheless valuable. What I want to do 
is to consider a piece of evidence the relevance of which for 
understanding the character of the dikastic oath has been over-
looked. The passage is in Aristotle’s discussion of the Politeia 
(‘Ideal City’) of Hippodamus of Miletus in the second book of 
the Politics (2.8). According to Aristotle, Hippodamus claimed 
that the existing legal system ran the risk of forcing the dikasts 
into violating their oath, and he accordingly proposed a new 
legal procedure for his ideal city designed to prevent this form of 
dikastic perjury in the law courts (1268a1–6). The paper will 
 
Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford 1993) 54; A. Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts 
of Classical Athens (Cambridge 2006) 72. Support for this interpretation has 
traditionally been found in the extensive use of extra-legal argumentation in 
Athenian law court speeches as well as in passages from Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
1.15. 
8 H. Meyer-Laurin, Gesetzprinzip und Billigkeit im attischen Prozess (Weimar 
1965) 29; Harris, The Rule of Law 104–109. This interpretation has tra-
ditionally drawn support from the suggestion, made twice in the Demosthenic 
corpus, that the oath-bound dikasts are meant to follow their most just con-
sideration “concerning matters where there are no laws” (20.118, 39.40). 
9 Harris, The Rule of Law 109. 
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undertake a close reading of Hippodamus’ argument, as pre-
sented and discussed by Aristotle. This close reading will lead me 
to conclude that the discussion of Hippodamus in the Politics 
speaks strongly against any interpretation of the dikastic oath 
that attempts to reduce the justice clause to something like a 
default clause to be used only in exceptional cases. What Hip-
podamus took the dikasts under the existing (Athenian) system 
to be violating, I will argue, must be understood as a general 
requirement to vote in accordance with justice.  
2. Hippodamus’ legal procedure 
Among his contemporaries, as well as in modern scholarship, 
Hippodamus of Miletus (active mid-fifth century B.C.) seems to 
have been best known in his capacity of architect and urban 
planner.10 But according to Aristotle in the Politics, he was also 
“the first person not engaged in practical politics who ventured 
to say something about the best politeia” (1267b29–30).11 Among 
other striking features, such as a threefold division of the citizens 
and the land (1267b30–37) and a law to promote innovation 
 
10 In addition to being widely credited with having invented the orthogonal 
street plan, he is reported to have been involved in the founding of Rhodes, 
the Piraeus, and the colony of Thurii. On the dating of Hippodamus and his 
career in urban planning: A. Burns, “Hippodamos and the Planned City,” 
Historia 25 (1976) 414–428; G. Shipley, “Little Boxes on the Hillside: Greek 
Town Planning, Hippodamos and Polis Ideology,” in M. H. Hansen (ed.), 
The Imaginary Polis (Copenhagen 2005) 335–403. Shipley includes a handy 
collection of ancient sources for Hippodamus.  
11 Aristotle is our only source for the political ideas of Hippodamus. 
Stobaeus’ Florilegium contains five extensive fragments from a Politeia by 
“Hippodamus the Pythagorean” and one fragment from a work on happiness 
by “Hippodamus the Thurian,” but both are widely believed to be later for-
geries (cf. J. C. Hogan, “Hippodamus and the Best Form of Government and 
Law,” in The Western Political Quarterly 12 [1959] 763–783; Chr. G. Tortzen, 
“Jens Baggesen og Hippodamos,” Meddelelser fra Klassisk Arkæologisk Forening 37 
[1997] 22–28). The best general discussion of Hippodamus as a political 
thinker is H.-J. Gehrke, “Bemerkungen zu Hippodamos von Milet,” in W. 
Schuller (ed.), Demokratie und Architektur. Der hippodamische Städtebau und die Ent-
stehung der Demokratie (Munich 1989) 58–68. 
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(1268a6–8), Hippodamus’ politeia had included provisions for a 
reformed and improved judicial system (1267b37–1268a6):12  
ᾤετο δ’ εἴδη καὶ τῶν νόµων εἶναι τρία µόνον· περὶ ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι 
γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ’ εἶναι τὸν ἀριθµόν, ὕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. 
ἐνοµοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἓν τὸ κύριον, εἰς ὃ πάσας ἀνά-
γεσθαι δεῖν τὰς µὴ καλῶς κεκρίσθαι δοκούσας δίκας· τοῦτο δὲ 
κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τινῶν γερόντων αἱρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς 
δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας ᾤετο γίγνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ 
φέρειν ἕκαστον πινάκιον, ἐν ᾧ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἁπλῶς, 
τὴν δίκην, εἰ δ’ ἀπολύοι ἁπλῶς, κενόν, εἰ δὲ τὸ µὲν τὸ δὲ µή, τοῦτο 
διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ᾤετο νενοµοθετῆσθαι καλῶς· ἀναγκάζειν 
γὰρ ἐπιορκεῖν ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. 
He also held that there are only three kinds of law. For those 
things concerning which legal actions are brought are three in 
number: outrage, damage, and death. He also established one 
single supreme law court, to which all those legal disputes that did 
not seem to have been well decided should be referred. This court 
he arranged to be manned by selected elders. He held that judg-
ments in the law courts should not be reached by means of voting, 
but that each [dikast] should carry a tablet: if he simply con-
demned, he should write the penalty; if he simply acquitted, he 
should leave it blank; and if it was partly one partly the other, he 
should specify that. For he believed that the current arrangement 
is not a good one. For it forces the dikasts to commit perjury when 
they decide either one way or the other. 
We can identify three different proposals in Aristotle’s sum-
mary of Hippodamus’ legal system: (1) a classification of laws 
into three kinds; (2) a ‘supreme court’ consisting of selected 
elders, to which cases from other law courts could be referred; 
and (3) the proposal, already mentioned above, concerning a 
reformed legal procedure. Proposals (1) and (2) are clearly of 
great interest to the historian of legal and political thought in 
their own right.13 But in this paper I will focus on the third and 
 
12 Text: W. D. Ross (Oxford 1957); transl. by the author. 
13 The notion of a court of appeals (2) represents a radical departure from 
Greek practice and may have provided a model for Plato’s legal system in the 
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last of Hippodamus’ proposals. According to Aristotle, he criti-
cised the existing legal procedure for forcing the dikasts into 
perjury when it required them to vote for either condemnation 
or acquittal. As a solution to this problem, he proposed a modi-
fied procedure, under which the dikasts, in addition to condem-
nation and acquittal, could also choose the third option of 
specifying on their tablets an intermediate verdict. 
Before turning to the details of Hippodamus’ argument, we 
need to consider the relevance of this passage for the question 
about the character of the Athenian dikastic oath. For at first 
glance it is perhaps not entirely clear why Politics 2.8 would be a 
promising context in which to search for clues about Athenian 
legal institutions. After all, Aristotle is here discussing the ideas 
of a Milesian thinker, not an Athenian, and at one point he ex-
plicitly remarks on Hippodamus’ apparent ignorance of certain 
Athenian institutions (state provision for war orphans, 1268a8–
11). However, I do not think this should lead us to disregard 
Aristotle’s discussion of Hippodamus as a potential source for 
understanding the Athenian legal system. The fact that Hippo-
damus was not an Athenian citizen does not mean that he was a 
stranger to Athenian politics and society. Aristotle himself bears 
witness to Hippodamus’ strong link to Athens when he refers to 
the latter’s role in the founding of Piraeus (1267b23), and this 
link is confirmed by other ancient sources, which also suggest 
that he lived for at least part of his life in Piraeus, where he 
owned a house and had the local agora named after him.14 
 
Laws (cf. P. Bise, “Hippodamos de Milet,” AGPh 35 [1923] 16–17; E. Schü-
trumpf, Aristoteles. Politik. Buch II–III [Darmstadt 1991] 267; T. J. Saunders, 
Aristotle. Politics I and II [Oxford 1995] 142). Some scholars have found in (1) 
a strikingly modern, even democratic, approach to law as aimed exclusively 
at managing interpersonal conflict and securing social order, rather than at 
promoting the happiness of society and the virtue of its citizens (F. Susemihl 
and R. D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle. Books I–V [London 1894] 332–334; cf. 
Saunders 141–142). 
14 Hippodamus’ life in Piraeus: schol. Ar. Eq. 327. The Hippodamean 
agora: Andoc. 1.45, Xen. Hell. 2.4.11. Lana suggests, on the basis of the Ari-
stophanic scholiast’s reference to his ownership of a house, that Hippodamus 
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Moreover, he is reported to have been well known among the 
Athenians (who held him in high esteem), and to have taken part 
in the Athens-led founding of Thurii.15 So in spite of what his 
alleged ignorance of Athenian provisions for war orphans might 
initially seem to imply, Hippodamus’ life and career were in fact 
very much centred on Athens, and it is not difficult to imagine 
that he would have had Athenian institutions in mind in his 
critical discussion of the existing legal system. 
Moreover, two observations about the text itself strongly 
encourage the use of Aristotle’s discussion of Hippodamus’ 
argument as evidence for the general character of the Athenian 
dikastic oath. (1) If Hippodamus had been taking his starting 
point in a significantly different foreign variant of the oath, we 
would have expected Aristotle to come to the aid of his (pre-
dominantly Athenian or Athens-oriented) readers/listeners by 
pointing this out explicitly and explaining how that oath differed 
from the well-known Athenian version. But Aristotle does no 
such thing. Instead he seems to simply assume that Hippodamus 
had something like the standard Athenian oath in mind (either 
the actual Athenian oath itself or a non-Athenian version that 
did not differ from the Athenian in any significant way). (2) 
Aristotle does not specify what element or clause in the oath the 
dikasts were alleged by Hippodamus to violate. He seems to 
assume that Hippodamus had in mind the violation of a general 
requirement in the oath and that the oath itself would be suffi-
ciently well known to his readers/listeners that he would not 
have to spell out precisely what that requirement was. Taken 
together, these two considerations suggest that a reconstruction 
of the reasoning behind Hippodamus’ proposal for a reformed 
legal procedure could likely yield a valuable clue as to how the 
 
must have been awarded Athenian citizenship, which in turn explains how 
his son, Archeptolemus, could later become active in Athenian politics (I. 
Lana, “L’Utopia di Ippodamo di Mileto,” RF (Bologna) 40 [1949] 128–129; 
Archeptolemus is referred to in Plut. X orat. 883A2 and schol. Ar. Eq. 327). 
15 Reputation in Athens: schol. Ar. Eq. 327. Thurii: Hesychios s.v. “Hip-
podamou nemesis” (cf. Burns, Historia 25 [1976] 421). 
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general requirements of the dikastic oath were perceived and 
understood in a classical Athenian context. 
The scholarly literature on Politics 2.8 has seen two funda-
mentally different ways of making sense of Hippodamus’ argu-
ment.16 The first, the ‘legalist’ interpretation, holds that the re-
quirement in the oath that the existing judicial procedure al-
legedly forces the dikasts to violate is specifically the requirement 
to vote in accordance with the laws. The idea here is that the 
legal charge, or indictment, could sometimes contain several 
different counts and that an individual dikast might find himself 
convinced that the accused is guilty of only some of these counts 
but not of others. The legal indictment on which Socrates was 
put on trial, for instance, famously charged him with both (1) not 
recognising the gods recognised by the polis and introducing 
new gods, and (2) corrupting the young.17 An oath-bound dikast 
at Socrates’ trial who believed that Socrates was guilty of (1) but 
not of (2) would find himself forced to choose between two 
outcomes of equally questionable legality: either condemning 
Socrates on both counts or acquitting him on both. Neither 
option, it seems, would be compatible with his oath to vote in 
accordance with laws. Hippodamus’ solution, on the legalist 
interpretation, should be understood as an attempt to prevent 
such potential perjury by allowing his dikasts the freedom to 
distinguish between separate elements of the indictment and to 
specify, on their tablet, which elements they agree with and 
which they do not.18 
On the second view, the ‘justice’ interpretation, the problem 
with the current judicial procedure is that it sometimes forces the 
dikast to violate a general requirement to vote in accordance 
 
16 Scholars have traditionally adopted one or the other reading, usually 
without any consideration or discussion of the alternative view. 
17 The legal indictment is cited in Diog. Laert. 2.40. Cf. M. H. Hansen, 
The Trial of Sokrates – from the Athenian Point of View (Copenhagen 1995) 16. 
18 The legalist interpretation is found in: W. I. Newman, The Politics of 
Aristotle II (Oxford 1887) 306; A. Cassayre, La Justice dans les cités grecques 
(Rennes 2010) 333.  
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with justice (or, alternatively, with “the most just considera-
tion”), namely in those cases where the procedure forces him to 
choose between two outcomes, neither of which seems to him to 
represent a just (or the most just) outcome. This situation could 
arise in cases where the dikast agrees with the accuser that the 
accused is guilty as charged and thus deserves a punishment, but 
also believes that, given the circumstances, the specific punish-
ment demanded in the charge would be unjust (or at least less 
just than it could be). On this reading, then, the solution pro-
posed by Hippodamus should be understood in penal rather 
than legal terms: the dikast who finds the accused guilty has the 
option to disregard the punishment demanded and to specify 
instead, on his tablet, what he takes to be the most just punish-
ment in this particular case.19 
The choice between these two interpretations has important 
implications for the question with which we began, concerning 
the general character of the dikastic oath in Athens. If the legalist 
interpretation is right, Aristotle’s discussion of Hippodamus in 
the Politics supports the view that the oath was generally under-
stood to require that dikastic decision-making first and foremost 
adhere to the laws. But if the justice interpretation is right, then 
that same discussion constitutes strong evidence that the oath 
was also naturally associated with a general requirement to vote 
in accordance with justice. Now, unfortunately, it does not seem 
to me possible to choose definitively between the two different 
lines of interpretation on the basis of Aristotle’s summary of Hip-
podamus’ proposal alone (1268a1–6). Not only is that summary 
is highly sketchy and compressed, it is also phrased in rather 
vague terms that offer little help on this specific question: (1) The 
Greek term dikē (a3) is notoriously protean and can, in a context 
such as this, mean both “legal indictment,” “judgment,” and 
 
19 The justice interpretation is found in: Schütrumpf, Politik 274; Saunders, 
Politics 144; A. Boyer, “Du nouveau chez les Anciens: Remarques a partir 
d’Hippodamos,” RPhilos 198 (2008), 413; C. D. C. Reeve, Aristotle. Politics. A 
New Translation (Indianapolis/Cambridge 2017) 270 n.230. 
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“punishment.”20 So the fact that the intermediate verdict in 
Hippodamus’ scheme is contrasted with simply “writing the dikē” 
does not reveal whether that intermediate verdict was under-
stood by Hippodamus (and Aristotle) along legal or penal lines. 
(2) Aristotle’s description of the intermediate position that a 
dikast may wish to adopt on the issue—τὸ µὲν τὸ δὲ µή (a4)—
could refer both to a position reached by making strictly legal 
distinctions (‘guilty on this count, but not on that’) and to a 
position reached by distinguishing more general considerations 
for and against the accused, which should be taken into account 
in determining what is a just punishment in his case (‘guilty in 
this sense, but not in that sense’). (3) The same is true of the 
phrase τοῦτο διορίζειν (a4–5), which Aristotle uses for what the 
dikast with an intermediate view should write on his tablet. For 
it is possible to read that phrase both as suggesting that the dikast 
should specify which counts of the legal charge he agrees with 
and which he does not (the legalist interpretation) and that he 
should specify what he believes the just punishment would be in 
this case (the justice interpretation).  
However, this indeterminacy in Aristotle’s account should not 
lead us to abandon all hope of coming to a better understanding 
of Hippodamus’ argument for a reformed legal procedure. For 
later in the same chapter of the Politics Aristotle returns to that 
argument and subjects it to an extended, and highly critical, 
examination (1268b4–22). This later passage provides important 
clues as to how we should understand Hippodamus’ original 
argument. In fact, I will argue that a closer look at Aristotle’s 
critical discussion of Hippodamus’ argument offers good reasons 
for rejecting the legalist interpretation and for adopting the 
justice interpretation. 
3. Aristotle’s criticism 
Aristotle’s critical discussion of the legal system in Hippo-
damus’ ideal politeia, later in the chapter, is somewhat selective. 
There is no mention of Hippodamus’ three-fold categorisation 
 
20 Cf. R. Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes, ein Beitrag zu Geschichte der Rechts-
idee bei den Griechen (Leipzig 1907) 104–106.  
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of laws, nor of his innovative idea for a gerontic court of appeals. 
Instead, Aristotle passes directly from an elaborate discussion of 
the tripartition of land and citizens (1268a16–1268b4) to an 
equally elaborate discussion of one specific element of Hippo-
damus’ legal system, his reform of how judgments are made in 
the law courts (1268b4–22): 
οὐ καλῶς δ’ οὐδ’ ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόµος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν 
διαιροῦντα, τῆς δίκης ἁπλῶς γεγραµµένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν 
δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. (1) τοῦτο δὲ ἐν µὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν 
ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται γὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν 
δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον τούτου τῶν 
νοµοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ µὴ 
κοινολογῶνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης 
ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν ὀφείλειν µὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οἴηται, µὴ τοσοῦτον δ’ 
ὅσον ὁ δικαζόµενος; ὁ µὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι µνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρινεῖ 
δέκα µνᾶς (ἢ ὁ µὲν πλέον ὁ δ’ ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ 
τέτταρας, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι µεριοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ 
πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δ’ οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς 
διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; (2) ἔτι δ’ οὐδὲν ἐπιορκεῖν ἀναγκάζει τὸν 
ἁπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἴπερ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλη-
µα γέγραπται, δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ µηδὲν ὀφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας 
κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι µνᾶς· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ, ὁ κατα-
δικάσας, µὴ νοµίζων ὀφείλειν τὰς εἴκοσι µνᾶς. 
The law concerning judgment is also problematic, i.e. the law that 
prescribes that judgments should be reached by making distinc-
tions, though the charge is written in simple terms, and that the 
dikast should be turned into an arbitrator. This is possible in an 
arbitration process, even with several arbitrators (for they can 
confer with each other about the judgment), but it is not possible 
in the law courts. Indeed, most lawgivers establish the opposite 
principle and arrange things so that the dikasts do not confer with 
each other. How then will the judgment not be confused, when 
the dikast thinks that the accused should pay something, but not 
as much as the accuser thinks? For the latter think 20 minae are 
due, but the dikast judges that 10 minae are due (or the one more, 
the other less), another dikast 5 minae, another 4, and in this way 
it is clear that they will be split. And some will condemn to the full 
amount, others nothing. So how will the votes be processed? 
Furthermore, nothing forces the dikast who either simply acquits 
or simply condemns into committing perjury, if indeed the plaint 
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has been written in a simple way, as is proper. For he who 
condemns does not judge that the accused should pay nothing, 
but rather that the accused should not pay 20 minae. But he who, 
believing that the accused should not pay 20 minae, nonetheless 
condemns him—he is the one who is committing perjury.    
We can identify two separate points of criticism in this passage. 
Aristotle’s first and longest argument concerns the practical 
feasibility of Hippodamus’ proposal (1268b6–17). In the second 
argument, Aristotle defends the current manner of reaching 
decisions in the law courts, arguing that the requirement that the 
dikasts side with one party or the other does not necessarily in-
volve the risk of dikastic perjury, as Hippodamus thought (b17–
22). In what follows, I wish to take a closer look at these two 
arguments in turn. Can they help us decide between the legalist 
and the justice interpretation? 
3.1 Aristotle’s argument from practicality (1268b6–17) 
Let us begin with Aristotle’s first argument, aimed at the 
practicality of Hippodamus’ proposal. The problem with that 
proposal, as Aristotle sees it, is that it is hard to see how it can 
deliver a judgment that is not “confused” (ταραχώδης, b11). 
After all, under Hippodamus’ scheme the dikasts would pre-
sumably often come up with a wide range of different individual 
verdicts, some settling for various intermediate positions, others 
siding either simply with the accuser or simply with the accused. 
But since law courts (unlike arbitration) do not allow for con-
ference and deliberation among the dikasts, it is hard see how 
these many individual verdicts could be processed into one single 
final judgment.21 The underlying assumption here seems to be 
 
21 Aristotle’s additional remark about the prohibition against dikastic con-
ferring established by many lawgivers (b9–11) has puzzled some commen-
tators. What is the relevance of this remark in a criticism of Hippodamus, 
who, presumably, could simply have chosen not to follow other lawgivers in 
this regard? (Cf. N. Loraux, The Divided City [New York 2002, French ed. 
1997] 237.) But the remark does make sense in the context when we consider 
it not just as a remark about what lawgivers in fact happen to do, but also as 
an allusion to their reasons for doing so. Aristotle’s point, I take it, is that, 
even if conferring were possible among several hundred dikasts (which it is 
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that Hippodamus’ law courts would be large popular law courts, 
not unlike the Athenian dikasteria with their dikastic panels of 
between 200 and several thousand members.22 Whereas the cur-
rent system allows for a relatively easy way of reaching a decision 
in law courts of this magnitude (counting and comparing the 
votes for and the votes against), things would be far more com-
plicated in a system that allowed each of the hundreds or 
thousands of dikasts to formulate individual intermediate ver-
dicts.  
At first glance, Aristotle’s examples of dikasts who each come 
up with a different verdict (b11–16) clearly seem to support the 
justice interpretation, as outlined above. For what we get in 
those examples is a list of different fines or penalties (20, 10, 5, 
and 4 minae). This would suggest that Aristotle understands the 
intermediate option that Hippodamus offered his dikasts along 
penal rather than legal lines: the idea seems to be that the oath-
bound dikast could avoid perjury by formulating what he himself 
believes is the (most) just punishment for the condemned (rather 
than by distinguishing between counts in the legal indictment). 
But while Aristotle’s description of dikastic disagreement does 
seem to point in the direction of the justice interpretation, it is 
not strictly speaking incompatible with the legalist interpreta-
tion. After all, Aristotle could perhaps be using the reference to 
different penalties as shorthand for different legal counts carry-
ing separate penalties. On this reading, the variety of punish-
ments proposed (20, 10, 5, 4 minae) should be understood as an 
expression of the fact that the dikasts disagree about the under-
lying legal question: each individual dikast would formulate his 
proposed penalty on the basis of his beliefs about which parts of 
the indictment the accused was guilty of and which he was not. 
Of course, this line of interpretation requires reading quite a lot 
 
not), it would still not be a good idea to allow it: all lawgivers know that a fair 
and impartial trial requires that the ballot be secret, but this is hard to achieve 
in a system that allows for dikastic conferring. Cf. Newman, Politics 305; 
Saunders, Politics 144. 
22 Cf. E. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford 1946) 71 n.1; Schütrumpf, 
Politik 267; Saunders, Politics 144. 
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into Aristotle’s examples, but it is worth considering since it 
could perhaps help us develop a more charitable reconstruction 
of his argument as a whole. Proponents of the justice interpre-
tation have sometimes worried about the force of Aristotle’s 
objection to the practicality of Hippodamus’ scheme. As Trevor 
Saunders complains, “the obvious answer” to Aristotle’s rhetori-
cal question in b16–17 (“So how will the votes be processed?”) 
seems to be: “add up the figure, and divide by the number of 
jurors. Why is he making such heavy weather of the matter?” 
(Politics 144). But if the penalty proposals listed by Aristotle are 
taken as shorthand for different assessments of the counts on the 
legal charge, Aristotle’s argument would be less vulnerable to 
this objection. After all, a clear decision about what exactly the 
accused is guilty of cannot be reached simply by means of the 
mathematical operation of taking the average. So the legalist 
reading would offer a neat solution to Saunders’ worry. But on 
the other hand, if that is what Aristotle really had in mind here, 
why would he choose to make his point in such an elliptical and 
potentially misleading fashion? One must conclude, I think, that 
Aristotle’s examples of dikastic disagreement do not in them-
selves provide clear support for either of the two interpretations 
under consideration. While the most natural reading of those 
examples tends towards the justice interpretation, what Aristotle 
says can also be understood in a way that supports the legalist 
interpretation. 
More promising, I think, is Aristotle’s initial gloss on Hip-
podamus’ proposal as “turning the dikast into an arbitrator” 
(γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν, 1268b6). Arbitration (diaita), 
in both its official and unofficial form, was an important means 
of dispute resolution in classical Athens, but it differed in im-
portant ways from how trials were conducted in the law courts.23 
In particular, in marked contrast to the Athenian dikasts, who 
were required to side with one party or the other, the primary 
 
23 On the institution and procedure of arbitration in Athens: Todd, Shape 
of Athenian Law 123–125.  
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aim of the Athenian arbitrator was to formulate, alone or to-
gether with a small number of colleagues, a compromise and 
attempt to bring about a reconciliation between the parties.24 
Importantly, Aristotle elsewhere explicitly contrasts this flexi-
bility on the part of the arbitrator with a strictly legalist approach 
to dispute resolution. The context is the discussion of the virtue 
of epieikeia in the Rhetoric 1.13. Whereas the first part of that 
discussion focuses on epieikeia in the technical sense of the ability 
to rectify the inevitable shortcomings of the law, towards the end 
of the chapter Aristotle emphasises the more traditional Greek 
conception of the virtue, understood in terms of indulgence and 
leniency.25 The epieikēs man, Aristotle explains there, is someone 
who does not stubbornly insist on his rights and on the applica-
tion of strict legal justice. Having been wronged, he is someone 
who adopts a forbearing attitude towards those who have 
wronged him, allowing the particular circumstances of the 
situation to be taken into account and choosing negotiation over 
aggression (Rhet. 1374b10–19).26 This sentiment finds expression 
in the epieikēs man’s preference for referring his disputes to 
arbitration (εἰς δίαιταν) rather than to the law courts (εἰς δίκην, 
b19–20). As Aristotle remarks, this preference is due to the fact 
 
24 [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 53.2 states this explicitly with regard to official 
arbitration. But compromise and reconciliation were also central to unofficial 
arbitration: A. Scafuro, The Forensic Stage. Settling Disputes in Graeco-Roman New 
Comedy (Cambridge 1997) 117–122, 131–135. Examples of what such arbi-
tration compromises could look like are found in [Dem.] Against Neaera 59.46, 
70. Cf. also Aristotle’s own metaphorical use of the figure of the arbitrator, 
who is “most trusted” since he is “the person in the middle” (ὁ µέσος), in his 
discussion of the crucial political role of the middle class (Pol. 1297a5–6). 
25 On the two distinct ‘legacies’ (theoretical and traditional) that inform 
discussions of epieikeia in Aristotle: J. Brunschwig, “Rule and Exception: On 
the Aristotelian Theory of Equity,” in M. Frede and G. Striker (eds.), 
Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford 1996) 115–155. On the emphasis on tradi-
tional epieikeia in the last part of Rhet. 1.13: C. Horn, “Epieikeia: The Com-
petence of the Perfectly Just Person in Aristotle,” in B. Reis (ed.), The Virtuous 
Life in Greek Ethics (Cambridge 2006) 155–156. 
26 This traditional conception of the epieikēs man, as characterised by elattōsis 
(“lessening, concession”), is also found in Eth.Nic. 1136b20–21, Top. 141a16. 
Cf. Brunschwig, in Rationality in Greek Thought 124. 
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that the arbitration process, unlike the law court, is characterised 
by the same sentiment that we find in the epieikēs man himself: 
“For the arbitrator looks to what is epieikes, whereas the dikast 
looks to the law. This, in fact, is why the arbitrator was invented: 
so that the epieikes may hold sway” (b20–22). 
The close association between arbitration and the values of the 
epieikēs man reveals something important about Aristotle’s view 
of the intermediate position that an arbitrator traditionally oc-
cupies in a dispute between two parties. What distinguishes the 
arbitrator from the dikast is not that he adopts a more fine-
grained attitude to the legal issue, identifying different potential 
legal offences and holding the accused to account only for those 
he seems to have committed. After all, that would turn arbitra-
tion into a form of dispute resolution that is in a way more legalist 
than the law court trial. But as we saw, the epieikēs man is one 
who prefers to refer his disputes to arbitration precisely because 
that is a way not to insist on strict legal justice. What the arbi-
trator does is to formulate a decision under the guidance of those 
principles of epieikeia that also inform the attitude of the epieikēs 
man, i.e. a decision that takes into consideration the particular 
circumstances of the case and interprets those circumstances in 
a way that promotes compromise and reconciliation. Viewed 
against this background, Aristotle’s gloss on Hippodamus’ pro-
posal in Politics 2.8 speaks strongly in favour of the justice inter-
pretation and against the legalist interpretation: a system that 
allows the dikasts to make fine legal distinctions in the indictment 
would hardly have been referred to by Aristotle as “turning the 
dikast into an arbitrator.” By contrast, it would be perfectly 
natural for him to gloss in such manner a system that allows the 
dikasts, upon finding the accused guilty as charged, to disregard 
the punishment demanded in the charge and instead formulate 
the punishment they find most just in light of the circumstances. 
3.2 Aristotle’s defense of the current system (1268b17–22) 
In his second objection to Hippodamus, Aristotle argues that 
the current requirement in the law courts that dikasts vote either 
for one or the other party does not in fact involve the risk of 
perjury, contrary to what Hippodamus thought. For the ques-
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tion that faces dikasts in a law court trial, he claims, can itself be 
understood as a question that allows only of a yes or no answer. 
It is easy to see how this argument can be reconstructed in a way 
that is compatible with the justice interpretation of Hippodamus’ 
proposal: What the oath-bound dikasts are really being asked in 
a trial, Aristotle argues, is not what the just outcome of the 
dispute under consideration would be. Rather, they are being 
asked the specific question: “Is it just that the accused be con-
victed on the 20 minae charge?” This is a question that allows 
only of a yes or a no answer: either it is just or it is not just that 
the accused be convicted on the 20 minae charge. So the dikast 
cannot find himself in a situation where his siding with one party 
or the other forces him to violate his oath to vote in accordance 
with justice. Now, as some scholars have noted, Aristotle’s ar-
gument, on this reconstruction, commits him to some quite 
controversial views regarding justice and punishment. He ex-
pects the conscience of the dikast to tolerate that an accused is 
acquitted pure and simple in a case where a punishment of 20 
minae is demanded in the charge, but the dikast himself thinks 
19 minae are due.27 But while Aristotle’s argument on the justice 
interpretation might seem somewhat pedantic, we can at least 
make good sense of it as an argument against Hippodamus’ 
proposal. And this is less easy to do in the case of the legalist 
interpretation. For it is not at all clear how questions of legality 
can in the same way be successfully conceptualised as a yes-or-
no issue that avoids the risk of dikastic perjury. The simple 
question “Is it in accordance with the laws that the accused is 
condemned of the legal charge?” would still pose a problem for 
the dikast who has sworn to vote in accordance with the laws, 
but who believes that the accused is guilty of only some of the 
counts on the charge. So it seems that, on the legalist interpre-
tation, Aristotle’s argument either would be confused or would 
completely miss its target.28 
 
27 Cf. Saunders, Politics 144–145; P. L. P. Simpson, A Philosophical Com-
mentary on the Politics of Aristotle (Chapel Hill 1998) 108–109. 
28 Newman, a proponent of the legalist interpretation, accepts this negative 
assessment of Aristotle’s argument (Politics 306).  
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However, before we conclude that the second argument 
therefore supports the justice interpretation, two further issues 
need to be addressed. First, one might worry that the justice 
interpretation seems to saddle Aristotle with a strikingly con-
fused understanding of the position he is criticising. The issue 
here concerns the question of what specific type of Athenian trial 
Aristotle took Hippodamus to have in mind in his criticism of 
the existing legal system. Textbooks on Athenian law tradi-
tionally divide Athenian trials into two main types, depending 
on how the penalty is determined in case of conviction. In an 
agōn atimētos, the penalty was fixed by statute: if the accused was 
condemned by the dikasts, he would suffer the penalty specified 
in the law under which he was charged. In an agōn timētos, by 
contrast, the penalty would be determined as part of the trial 
process itself. If the dikasts voted for conviction, the successful 
accuser and the condemned would each propose a penalty, and 
the dikasts would choose between these two alternatives in a 
second round of voting. Now, on the justice interpretation, Ari-
stotle’s second argument against Hippodamus seems to assume 
that the latter had the agōn atimētos specifically in mind. Aristotle’s 
argument hangs on the idea that the dikast’s rejection of a 
specific penalty (20 minae) does not in itself imply anything 
about what other outcome the dikast does think would be just, 
only that the specific penalty on the table is not it. Hence, a 
dikast who believes that some intermediate penalty (19 minae) 
would be just can in good conscience vote against the accuser, 
even though this would in practice lead to acquittal. Since this 
argument requires that the dikast’s choice can be understood as 
the choice between assenting to or rejecting a single proposition, 
it only really seems to work as a defense of the existing legal 
system in those Athenian trials where a dikast is faced with the 
choice of either imposing some specific penalty or simply letting 
the accused off scot-free (i.e. agones atimētoi). It is not at all clear 
how it could deal with a timētos trial, where the dikast would have 
342 HIPPODAMUS OF MILETUS AND THE DIKASTIC OATH 
————— 
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 58 (2018) 324–348 
 
 
 
 
to choose between two different penalty proposals.29 But this 
conclusion seems to fit rather badly with Aristotle’s preceding 
account of dikastic disagreement (1268b11–17, discussed 
above). For in that passage, he speaks as though the penalty 
demanded in the charge is one that is proposed by the accuser 
(“when the dikast thinks that the accused should pay something, 
but not as much as the accuser thinks,” b11–13).30 In other words, 
Aristotle here seems to assume that Hippodamus had in mind 
an agōn timētos, where the penalty claimed in the charge is de-
termined by means of timēsis (“assessment”), not by statute. So it 
might seem that, on the justice interpretation, Aristotle comes 
off as strikingly confused about what precisely he takes Hip-
podamus to be arguing against. Neither of the two traditional 
Athenian trial types seems compatible with what Aristotle says 
in both of his arguments.31 
I believe this objection to the justice interpretation can be 
successfully met. One way of meeting it, of course, would be to 
challenge the assumption that the classification into timētoi and 
atimētoi trials represents an exhaustive description of Athenian 
law court trials.32 But I think a different, more attractive strategy 
for responding to the objection is possible. The issue here turns 
on the question of what it means for an accuser to “propose” a 
specific penalty within the Athenian legal system. Historians 
often stress the procedural orientation and so-called ‘open 
 
29 The dikasts in Socrates’ trial were, in the second round of voting, 
charged with deciding between the penalty proposal of the accusers (death) 
and that of the accused (3000 drachmae). It is not clear how this choice can 
be immunized from the risk of perjury in the way Aristotle suggests. 
30 ὅταν ὀφείλειν µὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οἴηται, µὴ τοσοῦτον δ’ ὅσον ὁ δικαζό-
µενος. The obvious verbal supplement in the comparative clause would be 
another οἴηται.  
31 The only scholar who seems to have noted this problem is Gernet (“ici 
la pensée parait confuse”: “Les Lois et le droit positif” in E. des Places, Platon 
XI.1 [Paris 1951] cxliii n.3). 
32 Todd points to cases where the schema does not seem to fit very well 
(Shape of Athenian Law 134). 
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texture’ of Athenian laws.33 While the laws typically specified in 
great detail how a case is to be brought to court and what the 
potential risks and penalties for both parties are, they rarely 
provided a definition of the offence itself. In practice, this meant 
that there was a significant overlap between different legal ac-
tions. Someone who had been wronged often had a choice about 
the kind of legal action he would bring against the offender.34 
The locus classicus for this idea of procedural flexibility is from 
Demosthenes Against Androtion, where the speaker goes through a 
list of different legal actions available against thieves: “You are 
strong and confident: use apagoge; you risk a thousand drachmae 
fine. You are weaker: use ephegesis to the magistrates; they will 
then manage the procedure. You are afraid even of that: use a 
graphe. You have no confidence and are too poor to risk a 1000 
drachmae fine: bring a dike before the arbitrator and you will run 
no risk” (Dem. 22.26–27). The speaker’s main focus, here, is on 
the difference between types of legal action in terms of their risks 
for the accuser himself. But the choice of legal action also had 
consequences for the accused, if he were condemned. For in-
stance, depending on the type of action brought against him, a 
condemned thief would suffer everything from a fine to execu-
tion.35 Importantly, this meant that, in Athens, an accuser could 
in some sense be said to have ‘chosen’ a specific penalty proposal 
even in those cases where the resulting trial would be of the 
atimētos type. He made this choice when he chose to bring a cer-
tain type of legal action. So Aristotle’s reference in b11–12 to an 
 
33 R. Osborne, “Law in Action in Classical Athens,” in Athens and Athenian 
Democracy (Cambridge 2010 [1985]) 171–177, 201; J. P. Sickinger, “Rhetoric 
and the Law,” in I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric (Malden 
2007) 289. The argument in the remainder of this paragraph owes much to 
Osborne’s seminal discussion. 
34 Osborne, in Athens and Athenian Democracy 175–177; Todd, Shape of Athenian 
Law 66, 160; Sickinger, in Companion 289. 
35 Osborne, in Athens and Athenian Democracy 176; cf. Todd, Shape of Athenian 
Law 66, 160. Hansen makes the same point about the prosecution of corrupt 
officials (Eisangelia. The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens [Odense 1975] 
11). 
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accuser who believes (οἴηται) that the accused should pay 20 
minae is therefore not incompatible with his subsequent ar-
gument, which seems to presuppose an agōn atimētos. What he 
describes, I suggest, is an accuser who, from among a range of 
available legal actions, has chosen to bring one that carries the 
statutory penalty of 20 minae.  
The second issue that needs to be addressed before we can 
conclude that Aristotle’s second argument supports the justice 
interpretation concerns the construal of the conditional clause 
(εἴπερ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἔγκληµα γέγραπται) in 1268b19. For this clause 
could perhaps be read in a way that makes Aristotle’s argument 
compatible with the legalist interpretation. More specifically, 
some have proposed that we read the conditional clause as im-
plying a partial concession on Aristotle’s part: Aristotle in fact 
agrees with Hippodamus about the risk of perjury in the current 
system, but he points out that the problem lies in the form of the 
question being asked, not in how the dikasts are allowed to 
answer. Legal indictments containing multiple counts might in-
deed force the dikast to violate his oath to vote in accordance 
with the laws, but if the plaint (ἔγκληµα) is written in a simple 
way (ἁπλῶς), i.e. containing only a single count, this risk of per-
jury can be eliminated without the need to reform the voting 
procedure itself.36 In the case of Socrates, for instance, the ac-
cusers should have brought two separate charges, one for intro-
ducing new gods and one for corrupting the young, instead of 
one complex charge. Had they done so, no oath-bound dikast 
could have been forced to vote in a way that violates his oath to 
vote in accordance with the laws. 
This line of interpretation could perhaps draw some support 
from the puzzling addition of δικαίως in b19. One way of con-
struing the grammatical role of δικαίως would be to take the 
adverb as a qualification of the two participles in the main clause 
(ἀποδικάσαντα and καταδικάσαντα, b18). On this reading, the 
addition of δικαίως is meant to make the rather obvious point 
 
36 Newman, Politics 306. Cf. Mirhady, in Horkos 3. 
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that a dikast in the current system only avoids perjury provided 
that he in fact votes in accordance with what he believes (taking 
δικαίως in the sense of “sincerely” or “truly”).37 If the dikast be-
lieves that his oath requires him to vote for condemnation but 
he is bribed or otherwise tempted into voting against that belief, 
he will of course be unable to avoid perjury, regardless of how 
the legal system is set up. But there is also an alternative way of 
taking this δικαίως, which might initially seem to offer some 
support for the legalist interpretation. This alternative construal 
understands the adverb as qualifying the conditional clause 
(εἴπερ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἔγκληµα γέγραπται, b19). On this construal, 
which draws support from the position of δικαίως at the end of 
the sentence and has been adopted in the translation above, the 
adverb is meant to signal, as a kind of afterthought, Aristotle’s 
approval of the condition he has just laid down: the dikast in the 
current system can avoid perjury, “if indeed the plaint has been 
written in a simple way (ἁπλῶς), as is proper (δικαίως).”38 This 
explicit recommendation on Aristotle’s part could then be read 
as an indication that he is here departing from current practice 
and proposing his own solution to the problem of perjury noted 
by Hippodamus. 
But I think there are good reasons why we should not adopt 
this reconstruction of the argument in b17–22. Note first that the 
second construal of the role of δικαίως above (as qualifying the 
conditional clause) does not necessarily imply a concession on 
Aristotle’s part. The adverb can simply be read as indicating his 
endorsement of current practice: legal charges are as a matter of 
 
37 This construal is found in the translations by Rackham (“Again, nobody 
compels the juror to commit perjury who, if the indictment has been drawn 
in simple form, gives a simple verdict of acquittal or condemnation, and gives 
it justly,” Aristotle. Politics (Cambridge [Mass.] 1944), and by Saunders 
(“Again, since the indictment is written in simple terms, nothing forces a 
person who returns in a just manner a simple verdict of condemnation or 
acquittal to commit perjury,” Politics). 
38 Newman (Politics 306) helpfully points to Eth.Eud. 1229b34 for an 
example of the use of δικαίως in the sense of “properly.” Schütrumpf (Politik 
274) refers to similar uses of similar adverbs in Aristotle. 
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fact written in a simple way—and that is as it should be. But not 
only is a non-concessive reading thus compatible with the most 
plausible construal of the grammatical role of δικαίως; it is also 
the reading that fits best with the rest of Aristotle’s discussion. As 
I indicated above, the concessive reading depends on under-
standing the crucial term ἁπλῶς in b20 as meaning “simply” in 
the sense of “in a non-complex/non-composite way”: an ἔγ-
κληµα written ἁπλῶς would prevent dikastic perjury because it 
would ensure that the dikast is never presented with a legal 
charge containing multiple counts. The problem is that this un-
derstanding of ἁπλῶς cannot be maintained when the passage is 
read in its larger context. Aristotle’s demand that the legal 
charge be written ἁπλῶς clearly echoes his opening paraphrase 
of Hippodamus’ proposal as “prescribing that the judgment is 
reached by making distinctions, though the charge is written in 
simple terms (τῆς δίκης ἁπλῶς γεγραµµένης, b5-6).39 Although 
Aristotle here uses the general term δίκη for the written legal 
charge, as opposed to the technical term ἔγκληµα (“plaint”), it 
seems clear that he means to refer to the same state of affairs in 
the two passages. But if so, then the later passage in b19 cannot 
be read as Aristotle’s recommendation of a minor change in the 
current legal system that would render it immune to Hippo-
damus’ criticism. For what Hippodamus claimed, it seems, was 
precisely that a system in which the legal charge is written ἁπλῶς 
is a system that runs the risk forcing the dikasts into perjury. The 
key term ἁπλῶς, when used to describe how the legal charge is 
written, can therefore hardly take the meaning of “in a non-
composite/non-complex way,” as the legalist construal of b19 
would have it. Rather, it must be understood as “simply” in the 
sense of “in an unqualified way” or “tout court.” A legal charge is 
written ἁπλῶς insofar as it makes an unqualified demand: the 
accused is guilty of X so as to be liable to punishment Y. Faced 
with such a demand, the dikast under Hippodamus’ scheme can 
either himself return an unqualified verdict (guilty/not-guilty tout 
court; cf. ἁπλῶς a3–4) or he can settle for a qualified, intermediate 
 
39 I follow Ross (OCT) and Newman (Politics 304) in reading here δίκης, 
rather than κρίσεως.  
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verdict. If this is how we must read ἁπλῶς in b19, as I think it is, 
then it becomes difficult to see how Aristotle’s argument can be 
made compatible with the legalist interpretation.  
4. Conclusion 
A close reading of Aristotle’s discussion of Hippodamus’ pro-
posal for a reformed legal procedure in Politics 2.8 yields evi-
dence in favour of the view that the justice clause of the Athenian 
dikastic oath was not understood to be restricted in its appli-
cation (i.e. it was not merely “a default clause to be used only in 
exceptional cases”). On the most plausible reconstruction of Ari-
stotle’s argument, the judicial requirement that the dikasts are 
claimed by Hippodamus to violate under the existing system is a 
general requirement to vote in accordance with justice or with 
their “most just consideration.” The fact that Aristotle does not 
feel the need to make this explicit in the text suggests that he 
assumes that this is what the dikastic oath was normally taken to 
require.  
I do not want to exaggerate the importance of this piece of 
evidence for the debate about the Athenian dikastic oath. First 
of all, it is obviously a piece of indirect evidence. As the preceding 
sections show, Aristotle’s discussion requires quite a lot of inter-
pretative unpacking before we can conclude that it supports the 
unrestrictive reading of the justice clause. The strength of my 
conclusion in this paper ultimately depends on the plausibility of 
my reconstruction of an argument that is, admittedly, somewhat 
compressed and elliptical. Secondly, it is important to note what 
my conclusion does not show, even if it is accepted. All that I can 
conclude from my reading of Politics 2.8 is that the justice clause 
in the dikastic oath seems to have been understood as a general, 
unrestricted requirement. My argument, in other words, can 
only establish that the dikast were expected to vote in accordance 
with justice in all their decisions. It tells us very little about how 
that general requirement was understood and interpreted by the 
Athenians (as opposed to how it was interpreted by Hippo-
damus). As I mentioned at the beginning, most scholars who 
adopt the unrestrictive reading of the justice clause understand 
that clause as a principle of ‘equity’ that allowed the dikast to 
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overrule strict legal justice if the circumstances seemed to require 
it. But there are other scholars who, while also accepting the 
general application of the justice clause, have suggested that law 
and justice were in fact assumed by the Athenian courts to be 
entirely consonant, and that appeal to the latter was usually 
made in order to complement legal considerations, not to over-
rule them.40 Aristotle’s discussion of Hippodamus cannot help 
us decide between these two interpretations of how the Athen-
ians viewed the oath’s general requirement of justice. For that, 
there is no getting around turning to all those other texts, law 
court speeches principal among them, which give us a glimpse 
of how the oath was appealed to and used in actual legal prac-
tice.41 
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40 E.g. Johnstone, Disputes and Democracy 40–42. 
41 I am grateful for the opportunities I had to discuss aspects of Aristotle's 
text and its ideas with Gorm Tortzen and Vincent Gabrielsen at the SAXO-
institute in Copenhagen. The paper also benefited greatly from written 
com¬ments on earlier drafts by Leo Catana and Adriaan Lanni, and from 
email correspondence with Lene Rubinstein on questions relating to Greek 
law. 
